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Like-Minded attempts to unite the extended mind hypothesis with findings from moral 
psychology in defence of what Sneddon calls the ‘Wide Moral Systems Hypothesis’ 
(WMSH).  The ‘wide’ indicates that moral cognition is partly constituted by the world 
beyond our skull and skin.  After sketching the conceptual territory in Ch. 1, Sneddon 
concentrates on defending the WMSH on empirical grounds.  He examines findings from 
moral psychology as they bear on moral judgment (Ch. 2), reasoning (Ch. 3), 
responsibility (Ch. 4), agency (Ch. 5) and amoralism (Ch. 6), demonstrating an 
impressive grasp of the empirical literature throughout.  He also provides interesting 
commentary on the work of prominent theoreticians such as Haidt, Hauser, Nichols, and 
Prinz.  Although I doubt whether Sneddon makes his ambitious central case for the 
WMSH, a professional audience interested or engaged in empirically orientated moral 
psychology will find the book valuable. 
 
According to the WMSH, when we think morally, we participate in wide 
cognitive systems.  Sneddon’s example of flocking birds (18–20) helps us get a handle on 
this idea.  Say that each bird in a flock tracks the movement of its neighbours and 
simultaneously looks for food.  Now say that the easternmost bird spots food and flies 
towards it, its neighbours follow, and the westernmost bird reliably finds its supper.  
Although the westernmost bird didn’t initially know the location of the food, Sneddon 
argues that the bird responded to it by participating in a wide cognitive system mediated 
by the mental states and behaviour of its flockmates.  The wide system, not the individual 
bird, processed the information.  This interpretation is licensed, according to Sneddon, by 
the degree of functional and causal integration exhibited by the putative wide system. 
 
How might we participate in a comparable wide moral system?  Sneddon argues 
that we are doubly ‘like-minded’ – the book’s title is a pun. We share token 
psychological processes and we make like moral judgments by tracking each other’s 
mental states.  Much of the book is concerned with explaining how we accomplish these 
tasks.  Drawing widely on experimental moral psychology, and in the process providing a 
helpful survey of the field, Sneddon argues that we employ a grab bag of methods.  Some 
of these are conscious, considered methods, while others are automatic.  Mind-reading 
and emotional capacities are especially important, enabling us to calibrate our moral 
judgments with our peers.  This much is consistent of course with conventional, narrow 
approaches.  However, Sneddon also argues that we can literally share psychological 
processes.  Thus, one person’s mental states, such as her emotional attitudes, can form 
part of another person’s moral judgment (mirror neurons are the proposed mechanism of 
transmission).  Moreover, external states of affairs, including the mental states of our 
peers, can play a constitutive, causal role in action production.  Beliefs, for instance, can 
be partly constituted by the states and processes that make up an individual’s 
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participation in a wider information processing system.  Some of the information-
processing necessary to produce action is ‘performed between the individual and the 
environment’ (190).  
 
Sneddon argues, then, that we typically think about moral matters in concert with 
others.  This fits with his emphasis on the importance of social conformity to moral 
judgment.  Given its interpersonal nature, moral judgment and reasoning requires us to 
read the mental states of our peers, including their emotional attitudes.  However, it can 
also involve participating in moral reasoning systems as rational, autonomous 
interlocutors.  This seems important if moral discourse is more about agreeing on the 
truth than agreeing with each other, as indeed Sneddon suggests (94).  Thus, we share 
information, tell stories and reason together in order to form judgments, solve problems, 
attribute moral responsibility and figure out the shape of our shared moral environment.   
 
Overall, Sneddon develops a heterogeneous, dis-unified account of moral 
cognition.  Moral judgment and reasoning depend on processes that can be rational, 
emotional and/or instinctive, internal and/or external.  Sneddon offers this as an 
alternative to the traditional reason versus emotion, Kant versus Hume metaethical 
debates.  Indeed, he suggests at one stage that finding a third way is ‘the primary aim’ of 
the book (1).  But although he makes a strong case that moral judgments can be formed in 
various ways, and although his refusal to find artificial unity in over-generalisation is 
appealing, the relationship between the apparent heterogeneity of moral cognition and the 
traditional debates he alludes to is uncertain at best.  For those debates primarily concern 
the content of moral judgments, and not, in the first place, the mechanisms causally 
responsible for making the judgments.  Very likely the two are related, but the 
relationship is messy and controversial.  It might be, for instance, that non-rational 
processes produce rational moral judgments, or vice versa.  At the very least Sneddon’s 
conclusion is too quick, and it is therefore a pity that his claim to have found a third way 
is given such prominence in the opening paragraphs and in the blurb. 
 
Unfortunately, overambitious claims recur in the book.  As I shall discuss shortly, 
the central instance of this is the WMSH itself.  However, Sneddon’s criticism of virtue 
ethics is also revealing.  As mentioned, Sneddon explains action production partly in 
terms of a person’s environment, rather than wholly in terms of her internal mental states.  
This picture of things leads him to consider the so-called ‘person-situation’ debate.  What 
are the relative contributions of personality and environment to the production of 
behaviour? Sneddon marshals empirical evidence, mostly well-known studies, in favour 
of the view that the contribution of the environment is much larger.  This leads him to the 
view that empirical psychology might be ‘virtue’s demise’ (163).  But his prediction 
involves attributing to virtue ethicists the implausible view that ‘the mechanisms that 
purportedly realize virtues and vices operate independent of the vagaries of situation’ 
(164).   This is a mischaracterisation of virtue ethics.  It is not sensible to suppose that 
virtuous dispositions produce the same action come what may.  Firstly, virtues are locally 
circumscribed in the sense that they are stable dispositions of thought or action, 
conducive to the good in a range of environments.  Secondly, virtues are not traditionally 
understood as mechanisms operating independently of the environment, but as capacities 
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for practical reasoning.  Because a virtuous person skilfully acts on reasons, she must be 
responsive to the ‘vagaries’ of the situation.  She will note, for instance, that the same 
type of action can be generous in one situation and spendthrift in another.  Sneddon’s 
prediction of virtue’s demise is, therefore, far too swift.  (I am also not sure that 
Sneddon’s criticisms of virtue-theoretic approaches can be reconciled with his own 
appeal to ‘habits of thought and action’ (220) as part of moral commitment and 
sensibility, or with his subsequent description of what it is to be charitable.) 
 
Returning to the central theme of the book, Sneddon does persuasively make the 
case that we are social creatures and that aligning our thought and action with that of our 
peers is a fundamental part of our moral practices.  It is far from clear, however, that this 
either requires or strongly supports the WMSH. After all, it is agreed on all sides that our 
thought and action, moral and otherwise, depends in crucial ways on our environment.  
But, if moral cognition is embedded, and depends upon environmental resources such as 
shared language and other minds, this hardly shows that the wider environment forms 
part of an individual’s moral cognition.  The fact that findings from moral psychology 
appear consistent with Sneddon’s WMSH is somewhat suggestive, but consistency is a 
relatively low bar. Why, then, the radical move of (re-)classifying these ‘wide’ social 
facts as mental states?  Why not, for instance, argue that narrowly realized mental states 
are more tightly integrated with their environments than is generally appreciated?  And 
why constitution as opposed to causation, context, or enablement?  As with the flock of 
birds, Sneddon appeals to replicable causal and functional integration between an agent 
and her environment as the hallmarks of a wide system.  But, his frequent appeal to an 
abstract schema capturing these features (7, 20, 72, 155, 200) is insufficient either to 
clinch the philosophical argument or to tie the threads of his discussion together. 
 
While the prospect of applying the extended mind hypothesis to moral 
psychology seems like an exciting one, Like-Minded fails to make a compelling case for 
the project.  Instead, Sneddon gives us a mixture of detailed, careful discussion of 
empirical work and rather over-ambitious, under–developed philosophical claims.  If the 
latter may leave some readers feeling short-changed, the former is solid, professional 
work (written in solid, professional prose).  In particular, Sneddon helpfully sets out and 
synthesises empirical findings tending to support the view that moral cognition is first, 
foremost, and fundamentally an interpersonal process, while also making useful 
contributions to the theoretical debates surrounding recent findings in moral psychology.  
Like-Minded merits attention for these reasons. 
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